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Abstract
Liquidity plays an important role in explaining how banks determine their allocation
of funds. This paper examines whether this fact can explain yield spreads and the
term structure of interest rates. The paper models banks’ demand for liquidity in a
manner similar to that used to study household need for liquidity, namely, by using
a cash-in-advance type model. The paper ﬁnds that the shadow price of the cash-in-
advance constraint plays an important role in determining yield spreads. The empirical
part of the paper shows that the expectations hypothesis might be salvaged under the
maintained hypothesis concerning the liquidity premium and risk premium.
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An attractive theory of the term structure of interest rates is the expectations hy-
pothesis, which holds that the long rate equals expected future short rates over the
term of the bond. Many empirical studies, such as Shiller, Campbell, and Schoen-
holtz (1983), Fama (1984), Mankiw and Miron (1986), Fama and Bliss (1987), Mishkin
(1988), Hardouvelis (1988), Froot (1989), Simon (1989, 1990), Cook and Hahn (1990),
Campbell and Shiller (1991), and Roberds, Runkle and Whiteman (1996), ﬁnd that the
estimated coeﬃcients in a regression of the change in the expected future short-term
interest rates on the yield spread are signiﬁcantly less than the value of unity pre-
dicted by the expectations hypothesis and diﬀer as the forecast horizon varies.1 Even
though Fama (1984), Mishkin (1988), Hardouvelis (1988), and Simon (1990) have found
yield spreads do help predict future rates, the coeﬃcient appears inconsistent with the
expectations hypothesis.
Several studies, such as Mankiw and Miron (1986), McCallum (1994), and Rude-
busch (1995), have shown that even if the expectations theory did hold, it would be
hard to use it for forecasting due to interest rate smoothing by the Fed. Mankiw and
Miron (1986) argue that the negligible predictive power of the spread after the founding
of the Fed did not reﬂect a failure of the expectations theory. Instead, they suggest
that the Fed ‘stabilized’ short-term rates, such as the three-month rate, and by induc-
ing a random-walk behavior eliminated any predictable variation. McCallum (1994)
proposes that the empirical failure of the rational expectations theory of the term struc-
ture of interest rates can be rationalized with the expectations theory by recognition
of an exogenous random term premium plus the assumption that monetary policy in-
1Rudebusch (1995) refers to ’U-shaped’ pattern of the predictability of the yield curve. Roberds
and Whiteman (1999) state the existence of a "predictability smile" in the term structure of interest
rates: spreads between long maturity rates and short rates predict subsequent movements in interest
rates provided the long horizon is three months or less or if the long horizon is two years or more, but
not for immediate maturities.
2volves smoothing of an interest rate instrument—the short-term rate—together with the
responses to the prevailing level of the spread. Rudebusch (1995) states that Federal
Reserve interest rate targeting accompanied by the maintained rational expectations
hypothesis explains the varying predictive ability of the yield curve.
Previous studies have also focused on the possibility of a time-varying risk premium
and concluded that a time-varying risk premium can help explain the failures of the
expectations theory. Examples include Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987), Simon (1989,
1990), Friedman and Kuttner (1992) and Lee (1995), among others.
However, Evans and Lewis (1994) argue that a time-varying risk premium alone is
not suﬃcient to explain the time-varying term premium in the Treasury bill. Dotsey
and Otrok (1995) suggest that a deeper understanding of interest rate behavior will be
produced by jointly taking into account the behavior of the monetary authority along
with a more detailed understanding of what determines term premia.
Recently, Bansal and Coleman (1996) argue that some assets other than money
play a special role in facilitating transactions, which aﬀects the rate of return that
they oﬀer. In their model, securities that back checkable deposits provide a transaction
service return in addition to their nominal return. Since short-term government bonds
facilitate transactions by backing checkable deposits, this results in equilibrium in a
lower nominal return for these bonds. Such a view implies that liquidity plays an
important role in determining the returns of various securities.
In general, liquidity refers to the ease with which an asset can be bought or sold.
Asset purchases or sales are subject to transaction costs and the liquidity of an asset
decreases as the costs incurred in buying and selling it increase. So, if liquidity is an
important factor determining the returns of ﬁnancial assets, liquidity may be impor-
tant for yield spreads and the term structure of interest rates. But how do investors
consider liquidity in allocating their funds between securities of diﬀerent terms? Since
3commercial banks are principal investors and primary dealers in instruments such as
Federal funds, commercial paper, and Eurodollar CDs, a study of liquidity demand
by commercial banks may provide the key to answering this question. Stigum (1990)
states that “in the money market, in particular, banks are players of such major im-
portance that any serious discussion of the various markets that comprise the money
market must be prefaced with a careful look at banking.” Cook and La Roche (1993)
also emphasize that commercial banks play an important role in the money market.
In terms of banks, liquidity means having ready cash (i.e., reserves) in all curren-
cies to pay the bills, to fund the drawdowns of loan commitments, to meet depositor
withdrawals, to honor cash calls on foreign exchange contracts and guarantees, and to
meet reserve requirements (Abboud (1987)). If a bank might at some point be unable
to turn its assets into ready cash, the bank faces a liquidity risk. Liquidity is a crucial
fact of life for banks, and for this reason may have an implication for yield spreads and
the term structure of interest rates. For example, since banks’ loans are relatively illiq-
uid long-term assets, they are not useful for purposes of bank’s liquidity management.
By contrast, short-term government securities such as Treasury bills are very liquid.
Stigum (1990) emphasizes that all banks hold government securities for liquidity and
proﬁt.
In addition, since banks’ liquidity can vary as a result of policy of the Fed, ﬁnancial
market conditions, the individual bank’s speciﬁc demand for reserves, and so on, banks’
liquidity might play an important role in explaining time-varying term premia. Most
previous studies, however, have not focused on banks as the main investors in ﬁnancial
markets and thus, bank’s liquidity.
This paper attempts to answer the following question: Can the fact that liquidity
plays an important role in explaining how banks determine their allocation of funds
explain yield spreads and help provide an explanation for the failure of the expectations
4hypothesis?
The paper begins by developing a model of a bank’s optimal behavior. This model
incorporates the cash-in-advance constraint (liquidity constraint) of Clower (1967), Lu-
cas (1982), Svensson (1985), Lucas and Stokey (1987) and Bansal and Coleman (1996)
into a model of bank decision-making similar to Cosimano (1987), Cosimano and Van
Huyck (1989), Elyasiani, Kopecky and Van Hoose (1995), and Kang (1997). In addi-
tion, this model incorporates a time-varying risk premium. The paper ﬁnds that the
shadow price of the cash-in-advance constraint has an important role in determining
yield spreads and the term structure of interest rates. The empirical part of the pa-
per shows that the expectations hypothesis might be salvaged under the maintained
hypothesis concerning the liquidity premium and risk premium.
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 develops a model that incorporates
liquidity into banks’ optimal behavior and examines the determination of yield spreads
and the term structure of interest rates. Section 3 provides a brief empirical test of the
simple expectations hypothesis of the term structure and obtains empirical results for
the theoretical model developed in Section 2. A brief summary and concluding remarks
are given in Section 4.
2 The Model
This section develops a model that incorporates liquidity into banks’ optimal behavior.
The ﬁr s tp a r tp r e s e n t sas i m p l i ﬁed model in which bank loans are two-period assets
and Federal funds lent are one-period assets. The second part generalizes to the case
when bank loans are n-period assets and Federal funds are one-period assets. The key
results are the same in both cases.
52.1 Basic Model
2.1.1 Banks’ Optimal Behavior Subject to Cash-in-advance Constraint
There are many banks in the banking system. Banks have an inﬁnite horizon. Each
period consists of two sessions, the beginning of period t and the end of period t.W e
assume that the public prefers demand deposits to cash, so all the cash is deposited in
the bank at the end of the period. The reserve supply in the banking system does not
change unless the Fed changes it. When borrowers do not repay loan principal as well
as loan interest rate payment, banks face risks on loans (default risk). We assume that
this default risk increases as the quantity of loans or the maturity of loans increases.
Suppose that a representative bank has the following proﬁt function:
Πt = rL
t Lt − (δ0Lt +
δ1
2
L2
t)+rL
t−1Lt−1 − (δ0Lt−1 +
δ1
2
L2
t−1)+rF
t Ft,
where Lt is the quantity of new two-period loans made in the beginning of period
t, rL
t is the yield on two-period loans made at time t, rF
t is the yield on Federal funds
lent or borrowed at time t,a n dFt is the Federal funds lent or borrowed at time t. The
δs’ are non-negative constants. The two expressions in parentheses represent the risk
on loans each period.
The bank chooses the level of new loans, Lt, and lends it to the public at the
beginning of period t. The bank will get back the loan at the beginning of period
t +2 .A t t h e e n d o f p e r i o d t, it chooses the quantity of Federal funds to lend, Ft.
These choices, along with some other exogenous or predetermined factors, determine
the level of reserves, Rt, with which the bank will end the period. These other factors
are (1) the bank’s level of demand deposits, Dt, which is taken to be exogenous, with
a positive value for Dt −Dt−1 increasing the bank’s end-of-period reserve position; (2)
the repayment of the Federal funds the bank lent the previous period, Ft−1;a n d( 3 )
6the repayment of the loans the bank made two periods previously, Lt−2. The bank’s
end-of-period reserves thus evolve according to2:
Rt = Rt−1 + Lt−2 − Lt + Ft−1 + Dt − Dt−1 − Ft. (2.1)
In addition, the bank must satisfy the reserve requirement
Rt ≥ θDt, (2.2)
where θ is the required reserve ratio.
In the beginning of period t, a representative bank starts with reserve balances
given by Rt−1 + Lt−2, the transferred previous reserve balances plus the repayment of
the loans made two periods previously. Given the loan rate and the Federal funds rate,
a representative bank must choose its loan supply, Lt, before knowing the deposits, Dt.
This choice is subject to predetermined holdings Rt−1+Lt−2 of reserve balances. That
is, in our model, a borrower from the bank wants cash, and the bank can only extend
a loan to such a customer if it has cash (reserve) on hand equal to the amount of the
loan. In this case, the bank’s need for liquidity (suﬃcient reserves) can be transaction
purpose as well as precautionary purpose for meeting depositor withdrawals or reserve
requirement.
W ec a nm o d e lt h eb a n k ’ sd e m a n df o rl i q u i d i t yi nt h es a m ew a yt h a tt h ec a s h -
in-advance (hereafter CIA) literature has modeled demand for liquidity by private
households. In the conventional CIA formulation, goods must be purchased with cash,
and a consumer can only obtain goods if he has cash on hand suﬃcient to pay for them.
2We assume that interest income less default loss is paid out as stockholder dividends and so these
t e r m sd on o ta ﬀect the level of reserves. In practice, Fed funds interest is paid by banks a week after
the loan and term loan interest is paid much later. Abstracting from the eﬀects of interest payments
on reserves seems a useful simpliﬁcation which is unlikely to matter for the results presented here.
7In this case, a household’s demand for cash is mainly for the purpose of transaction.
In complete analogy, for the bank, loans are funded with reserves and the bank can
only have loan commitments with suﬃcient reserve balances. This kind of transaction
reserve model can be compatible with Hamilton (1996, 1998) in which banks would
want to hold reserves even if there were no reserve requirements, for the same reason
that members of the public hold cash: good funds are needed to eﬀect transactions.
Reserves are useful to banks beyond the purpose of reserve requirements in the sense
that reserves provide banks with the transaction service return. In this case, even
though banks are subject to the required reserve constraint, the true value of the
liquidity services reserve provides might not be captured with the only shadow price of
required reserve constraint.
How should we think of the CIA constraint in the light of borrowed reserves? Cosi-
mano and Sheehan (1994) show from the study of discount window borrowing by weekly
reporting banks disaggregated by Federal Reserve District that any single bank seldom
visits the discount window and argue that this behavior is consistent either with banks
not aggressively managing their discount window borrowings or more plausibly with
the presence of considerable harassment costs imposed by the discount window oﬃcer.
Hamilton (1998) states that banks act as if they faced a cost function for borrowing
reserves from the Fed and the cost of borrowing includes nonpecuniary costs of bor-
rowing in the form of additional regulation, supervision, and inferior credit standing
with other banks. In this point of view, banks should not place excessive reliance on
the discount window to obtain reserves and fund their loans to the public and thus,
they might need to hold excess reserves for liquidity yield purpose. Hence, the CIA
constraint which the bank faces might reﬂect bank’s demand for liquidity.
However, in either application, the strict CIA requirement ignores such real-life
institutions as credit cards available to consumers or within-day overdraft privileges
8available to banks on their accounts with the Fed. Even so, the requirement of needing
actual cash on hand for certain transactions seems to capture the key idea of what
is meant by liquidity and has proven a useful framework for thinking about liquidity
demand by private households. We propose that it may also be fruitful for seeing how
the need for liquidity may make a diﬀerence for understanding the rates of return on
assets of diﬀerent maturities held by banks. Thus, we propose that a representative
bank faces a CIA or liquidity constraint such as the following:
Lt ≤ Rt−1 + Lt−2, (2.3)
where Rt−1 is the reserve balance transferred from the previous period to the start
of period t. In this case, we assume that the repayment of outstanding loans at the
beginning of period t contributes to the bank’s liquidity balances at the beginning of
period t. Thus, the bank enters period t with predetermined holdings of reserves as
the liquidity balances and the bank’s new loans must obey the CIA constraint.
2.1.2 The Equilibrium
A representative bank faces the choice of new loans at the beginning of period t and the
choice of Federal funds at the end of period t. The state variables that are relevant for
the bank’s decision of the quantity of Federal funds to lend at the end of period t are
Lt,L t−1,L t−2,F t−1,R t−1, and Dt. Consider the following value function formulation
of the decision at the end of period t:
Ut(Lt,L t−1,L t−2,F t−1,R t−1,Dt)
=m a x
{Ft}
{rF
t Ft + βEtVt+1(Lt,L t−1,F t,R t,Dt)},
9subject to
Rt−1 + Lt−2 − Lt + Ft−1 + Dt − Dt−1 − Ft ≥ θDt,
where Ut(.) denotes the lifetime value of the bank’s optimal program as of the second
session of period t whereas Vt+1(Lt,L t−1,F t,R t,Dt) is the value as of the ﬁrst session
of period t+1and β denotes the discount factor. The choice of Federal funds is subject
to equations (2.1) and (2.2).
In the beginning of period t, a representative bank starts with reserve balances given
by Rt−1 +Lt−2. Given the loan rate and the Federal funds rate, a representative bank
must choose its loan supply, Lt, before knowing the deposits, Dt. The state variables
for the decision at the beginning of period t are Lt−1,L t−2,F t−1,R t−1, and Dt−1. The
value function of the beginning of period at time t is:
Vt(Lt−1,L t−2,F t−1,R t−1,Dt−1)=m a x
{Lt}
{rL
t Lt − (δ0Lt +
δ1
2
L2
t)
+rL
t−1Lt−1 − (δ0Lt−1 +
δ1
2
L2
t−1)
+EtUt(Lt,L t−1,L t−2,F t−1,R t−1,Dt)}
subject to
Lt ≤ Rt−1 + Lt−2,
where the choice of loan supply is subject to the CIA constraint, equation (2.3).
A representative bank’s problem is to maximize the value function Vt(.) subject to
the CIA constraint at the ﬁrst session of period t and the value function Ut(.) subject
to the balance-sheet constraint (2.1) and reserve requirement (2.2). When we derive
ﬁrst-order and envelope conditions, it is straightforward to characterize the equilibrium
10as satisfying the following equations:
rF
t = βEtηt+1 + λt, (2.4)
rL
t − (δ0 + δ1Lt)+βrL
t − β(δ0 + δ1Lt)
= rF
t + βEtrF
t+1 + ηt − βEtηt+1 (2.5)
where ηt and λt denote the multiplier of the CIA constraint and the multiplier of the
required reserve constraint respectively. The one represents the shadow price of the CIA
constraint while the other is the implicit price of required reserve constraint. Equation
(2.5) can be rewritten as follows:
rL
t =
1
(1 + β)
[rF
t + βEtrF
t+1]+( δ0 + δ1Lt)
+
1
(1 + β)
[ηt − β2Etηt+2]. (2.6)
The derivation of equations (2.4) - (2.6) is handled in Apendix A.
A representative bank chooses Ft (and hence a value for λt and Etηt+1)s oa st o
s a t i s f y( 2 . 4 ) . I ne q u i l i b r i u m ,Ft must be zero, and the exogenous supply of reserves
and demand for loans will determine λt and Etηt+1, which together with (2.4), will
determine rF
t . The interest rate adjusts to clear the market. The equation (2.4) bears
an analogy with Svensson’s (1985) paper. It states that the current Federal funds rate
is the sum of the discounted expected value of next period’s shadow price of the CIA
constraint and the shadow price of the required reserve constraint at time t.E v e n
though the required reserve constraint is non-binding and the shadow price of it is
zero, the existence of a binding liquidity constraint drives a positive Federal funds rate.
So against Federal funds, reserve is held for the future liquidity services it provides,
11and the value of these liquidity services is the value of relaxing the future liquidity
constraint. Equation (2.5) is an Euler equation and an optimal condition between the
loan market and the Federal funds market. The equation implies that the marginal
beneﬁt of increasing the volume of loans is equal to the marginal beneﬁt of lending
Federal funds.
Equation (2.6) states that the loan rate is the weighted average of the current
Federal funds rate and expected future Federal funds rate plus the cost resulting from
the risk (or transaction costs) on loans and the cost of loss of the liquidity beneﬁt.
The parenthesis of the right-hand side is the risk premium while the second bracket of
the right-hand side is the liquidity premium. The liquidity premium depends on the
diﬀerence between the current shadow price of the CIA constraint and the expected
shadow price of CIA constraint at time t +2 . If the bank expects the liquidity beneﬁt
of the loan lent at time t to be higher at the beginning of time t +2when the bank
gets back the loan lent at the beginning of time t, the bank doesn’t require as much
compensation for liquidity loss. On the other hand, if the bank expects the liquidity
beneﬁt of the loan lent today to be lower at the beginning of time t +2 , the bank will
require more compensation for liquidity loss.
Multiplying equation (2.5) by β and taking the expectation at time t − 1 and
rearranging it, we get:
Et−1rL
t =
1
β(1 + β)
[βEt−1rF
t + β2Et−1rF
t+1]+( δ0 + δ1Et−1Lt)
+
1
β(1 + β)
[βEt−1ηt − β3Et−1ηt+2]. (2.7)
Equation (2.7) is the term structure model thati n c o r po r a t e sat i m e -varying liquidity
premium and risk premium given information at time t−1. One point to make is that
if the CIA constraint is binding, monetary policy draining or injecting reserve balances
12can have an impact not only on the Federal funds rate and the loan rate, but also on
the term premium and thus, monetary policy can aﬀect the term structure of interest
rates.
2.2 General Model
2.2.1 The Equilibrium
So far, we focused on the simple case in which banks’ loans were two-period assets
and Federal funds lent one-period assets. In this section, we will extend our model
to the case in which banks’ loans are n-period assets and Federal funds lent remain
one-period assets. The basic set-up is the same. A representative bank’s proﬁt function
is as follows:
Πt = rL
n,tLt − (δ0Lt +
δ1
2
L2
t)+rL
n,t−1Lt−1 − (δ0Lt−1 +
δ1
2
L2
t−1)+...
+rL
n,t−1Lt−1 − (δ0Lt−n+1 +
δ1
2
L2
t−n+1)+rF
t Ft,
where rL
n,t is the yield on n-period loan made at time t. In this case, a representative
bank has two options at time t − 1. One option is for the bank to hold reserves at the
end of period t − 1 in order to lend them over n periods at the beginning of period t.
The other option is that the bank rolls over reserves as Federal funds for n periods.
If a representative bank lends the public loans over n periods, the bank faces risks on
loans and this default risk increases as the quantity of loans or the maturity of loans
increases. The expressions in parentheses represent the risk on loans each period.
At the end of period t, the bank chooses Ft, the quantity of Federal funds to lend.
These choices, along with some other exogenous or predetermined factors, determine
the level of reserves with which the bank will end the period. These other factors are
the same for (1) and (2) in the basic model and (3) the repayment of the loans the
13bank made n periods previously (Lt−n). The bank’s end of period reserves thus evolve
according to:
Rt = Rt−1 + Lt−n + Ft−1 + Dt − Dt−1 − Lt − Ft. (2.8)
In addition, the bank must satisfy the reserve requirement:
Rt ≥ θDt.
In the beginning of period t, a representative bank starts with reserve balances
given by Rt−1 +Lt−n. Given the loan rate and the Federal funds rate, a representative
bank must choose its loan supply, Lt, before knowing the deposits, Dt. As in the basic
model, the bank faces a CIA constraint:
Lt ≤ Rt−1 + Lt−n. (2.9)
The state variables that are relevant for the bank’s decision of the quantity of
Federal funds to lend at the end of period t are Lt,L t−1,...,L t−n,F t−1,R t−1, and Dt.
The value function formulation of the decision for the end of the period at time t is as
follows:
Ut(Lt,L t−1,L t−2,...,L t−n,F t−1,R t−1,Dt)
=m a x
{Ft}
{rF
t Ft + βEtVt+1(Lt,L t−1,...,L t−n+1,F t,R t,Dt)},
subject to
Rt−1 + Lt−n + Ft−1 + Dt − Dt−1 − Lt − Ft ≥ θDt.
The state variables for the decision at the beginning of period t are Lt−1,L t−2,...,L t−n,F t−1,R t−1,
14and Dt−1. The value function of the beginning of period t is as follows:
Vt(Lt−1,..,L t−n,F t−1,R t−1,Dt−1)
=m a x
{Lt}
{rL
n,tLt − (δ0Lt +
δ1
2
L2
t)+rL
n,t−1Lt−1 − (δ0Lt−1 +
δ1
2
L2
t−1)+...
+rL
n,t−n+1Lt−n+1 − (δ0Lt−n+1 +
δ1
2
L2
t−n+1)+EtUt(Lt,L t−1,...,L t−n,F t−1,R t−1,Dt)}
subject to
Lt ≤ Rt−1 + Lt−n.
From ﬁrst-order and envelope conditions, it is straightforward to characterize the
equilibrium as satisfying the following equations:
rF
t = βEtηt+1 + λt, (2.4)
(1 + β + ... + βn−1)rL
n,t − (1 + β + ... + βn−1)(δ0 + δ1Lt)
=( rF
t + βEtrF
t+1 + ... + βn−1EtrF
t+n−1)+ηt − βnEtηt+n. (2.10)
For n period loan and one period Federal funds, we get the same equilibrium condition
for the Federal funds market as the equation (2.4) in the basic model. (See Appendix
B for the derivation of equilibrium conditions (2.4) and (2.10)). Equation (2.10) can
be rewritten as follows:
rL
n,t =
1
(1 + β + ... + βn−1)
[rF
t + βEtrF
t+1 + ... + βn−1EtrF
t+n−1]
+(δ0 + δ1Lt)+
1
(1 + β + ... + βn−1)
[ηt − βnEtηt+n]. (2.11)
Equation (2.11) states that the n-period loan rate is the weighted average of the
15one-period current Federal funds rate and expected future Federal funds rates over n
periods plus the cost resulting from the risk on loans and the cost from the loss of
liquidity beneﬁt. Multiplying equation (2.10) by β, taking the expectation at time
t − 1, and rearranging it, we get:
Et−1rL
n,t =
1
β(1 + β + ... + βn−1)
[βEt−1rF
t + ... + βnEt−1rF
t+n−1]+( δ0 + δ1Et−1Lt)
+
1
β(1 + β + ... + βn−1)
[βEt−1ηt − βn+1Et−1ηt+n]. (2.12)
2.2.2 Term Structure Implication
Equation (2.12) determines the term structure of interest rates between the n-period
loan rate and the one-period Federal funds rate.3 This term structure model incorpo-
rates a time-varying liquidity premium and risk premium. Since banks’ liquidity can
vary over time, the liquidity diﬀerence shows up on the term structure model as the
liquidity premium. Hence, banks’ liquidity plays an important role in explaining the
time-varying term premium and thus can help to explain the widespread rejection of
the expectations hypothesis. Hence, a term structure model that incorporates banks’
liquidity demand into banks’ optimal behavior might provide an alternative to the
simple expectations hypothesis.
Assuming β =1 , equation (2.11) can be rewritten as follows:
rL
n,t =
1
n
Et
n−1 X
i=0
rF
t+i +( δ0 + δ1Lt)+
1
n
[ηt − Etηt+n]. (2.13)
3Most of the empirical term-structure literature concentrates on the term structure for government
securties. In this point of view, the term structure developed in our model might be limited for general
application. However, even so, the key idea of what is meant by liquidity seems to provide an signiﬁcant
implication for the term structure.
16To explore whether this model can quantitatively match the feature of the expectations
hypothesis under the maintained hypothesis concerning the liquidity premium and risk
premium, we need to get quantitative magnitudes of the shadow prices. Recall from
equation (2.4) that in equilibrium, the current Federal funds rate is the expected value
of next period’s discounted shadow price of the CIA constraint, assuming the required
reserve constraint is not binding.4 Thus, we can take conditional expectations of both
sides of equation (2.13) based on information available at t − 1 as in (2.12) to use the
previous Federal funds rate as the expected value of the discounted shadow price of
the CIA constraint. Similarly, we can assume Et−1rF
t+n−1 = Et−1ηt+n. Then, equation
(2.13) can be rewritten:
Et−1rL
n,t =
1
n
Et−1
n−1 X
i=0
rF
t+i +( δ0 + δ1Et−1Lt)
+
1
n
[rF
t−1 − Et−1rF
t+n−1]. (2.14)
Further assuming rational expectations, let vt+j,j=0 ,1,2,...,n−1,e t, and ξt denote
the following forecast errors orthogonal to information available at time t − 1:
vt+j = rF
t+j − Et−1rF
t+j,j=0 ,1,2,...,n− 1, (2.15)
et = rL
n,t − Et−1rL
n,t, (2.16)
ξt = Lt − Et−1Lt. (2.17)
4Frost (1970) shows that banks hold excess reserves because the cost associated with constantly ad-
justing reserve positions is greater than the interest earned on short-term securties and the proﬁtability
of holding excess reserves when interest rates are very low makes the banks’ demand for excess reserves
kinked at a low rate of interest. In practice, excess reserves from the data for depository institution
which are taken from Statistical Release provided by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors are always
positive during the sample period of our empirical study. Therefore, our assumption is consistent with
the U.S. data over this sample period.
17We also assume that et,ξt, and vt+j for all j’s are serially uncorrelated and mutually in-
dependent. Substituting equations (2.15), (2.16), and (2.17) into (2.14) and rearranging
it, we get:
rL
n,t =
1
n
n−1 X
i=0
rF
t+i +( δ0 + δ1Lt)+
1
n
[rF
t−1 − rF
t+n−1]
+(et −
1
n
n−2 X
j=0
vt+j − δ1ξt). (2.18)
Equation (2.18) provides plausible parameter values for the risk premium and liquidity
premium under above assumption. The second term on the right-hand side of (2.18),
δ0 + δ1Lt, and the third term, 1
n(rF
t−1 − rF
t+n−1), capture the risk premium and the
liquidity premium, respectively. Subtracting rF
t from both sides on equation (2.18)
and rearranging it result in:
1
n
n−1 X
i=0
rF
t+i − rF
t = −δ0 +( rL
n,t − rF
t ) − δ1Lt −
1
n
[rF
t−1 − rF
t+n−1]
−(et −
1
n
n−2 X
j=0
vt+j − δ1ξt). (2.19)
The model (2.19) implies that the simple expectations hypothesis doesn’t hold because
of the liquidity premium and the risk premium. We can estimate the model and exam-
ine if the expectations hypothesis might be salvaged under the maintained hypothesis
concerning the liquidity premium and the risk premium.
183 Estimation of the Term Structure Model
3.1 The Data
The weekly data set we use runs from February 1, 1984 to December 27, 2000, which
gives us 882 observations.5 The interest rates are taken from Statistical Release pro-
vided by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. We also take quantities of loans from
item H.8 (assets and liabilities of all commercial banks in the USA) of the Federal Re-
serve Statistical Release.6 Since this series refers to outstanding loans at each period,
we use the change in this series as a proxy for the volume of new loans extended. We
consider Federal funds rates as a short term rate and 1- and 3-month commercial paper
(CP) rates as long-term rates. All interest rates are averages of 7 calendar days ending
on Wednesday and annualized using a 360-day year.7 Here, the CP rate is viewed as
a substitute for the rate on bank’s loans to ﬁnancial and industrial companies.
Figure 1 shows movements of the Federal Funds rate and the 1-month and 3-month
CP rates during this sample. One interesting feature is that the Federal Funds rate
ﬂuctuated around the CP rates before 1990 U.S. recession but after the recession the
CP rates were higher than the Federal Funds rate. During the sample period, averages
of the Federal Funds rate, 1-month and 3-month CP rates are 6.23%, 6.28% and 6.29%
respectively, and thus the 1-month and 3-month CP rates are on average higher by 5
and 6 basis points respectively, than the Federal Funds rate. However, the standard
deviation of the Federal Funds rate is 1.93, higher than those of the 1-month and 3-
5Since the Fed changed from lagged reserve accounting to contemporaneous reserve accounting in
February 1984, we use only data after February 1984.
6These quantities of loans are loans and leases in bank credit by weekly reporting banks. These
quantities are slightly diﬀerent depending on all commerical banks, domestic commercial banks, and
large commercial banks. However, the estimation results were quantitatively and qualitatively similar.
7The original CP rates are business-daily averages of oﬀering rates on commercial paper placed by
several leading dealers for ﬁrms whose bond rating is AA or the equilvalent. After we multiply Friday’s
interest rate by 3 and use the value of the previous business day for holidays, we construct weekly
averages of 7-days series.
19month CP rates, 1.84 and 1.82, respectively which implies that the volatility of the
Federal Funds rate is somewhat higher than those of the CP rates.
3.2 A Test of the Expectations Hypothesis
We start from the test of the simple expectations hypothesis, which implies that the
long-term rate is the weighted average of the current short-term rate and expected
future short-term rates and that the current spread between the long-term rate and
short-term rate predicts the change in future short-term rates. That is,
rL
n,t =
1
n
Et
n−1 X
i=0
rF
t+i, (3.1)
where rL
n,t,r F
t are the n-period CP rate (our substitute for the n-period loan rate)
and one-period Federal funds rate respectively. Assuming rational expectations, one
can rearrange equation (3.1) to yield the following relationship as the term structure
regression for empirical investigation:
Model I: δ0 = δ1 =0 ,ηt = Etηt+n
1
n
n−1 X
i=0
rF
t+i − rF
t = α + φ(rL
n,t − rF
t )+εt, (3.2)
where εt = 1
n
n−1 P
i=0
rF
t+i− 1
nEt
n−1 P
i=0
rF
t+i and should be uncorrelated with any variable known
at time t. Here, n corresponds to 4 or 12 weeks for one- and three-month commercial
paper, respectively.
Equation (3.2) can be estimated by OLS with autocorrelation-heteroskedasticity
consistent errors. According to the simple expectations hypothesis, α =0 , and φ =1 .
This test can be nested within our term structure model (equation (2.19)) by imposing
20the restrictions δ0 = δ1 =0 ,a n dηt = Etηt+n. Table 1 shows the result for estimation
of (3.2).
The estimated coeﬃcient on the spread is signiﬁcantly less than unity and diﬀerent
from zero at conventional signiﬁcance levels. In addition, the estimated coeﬃcients on
the constant are signiﬁcantly less than zero. These results are very similar to previous
empirical studies.8
3.3 Test of the Expectations Hypothesis with Liquidity Premium and
Risk Premium
Our model developed in Section 2 implies that the simple expectations hypothesis does
not hold because of the liquidity premium and the risk premium. Since banks’ optimal
behavior is subject to a CIA constraint, bank’s liquidity causes the shadow price of
the CIA constraint to play an important role in yield spreads and the term structure
of interest rates. Thus, our model suggests that we need to incorporate a liquidity
premium and a risk premium into the simple expectations hypothesis. The model
(2.19) forms the basis of the tests of the term structure that we focus on. Subtracting
1
nrF
t+n−1 from both sides of (2.19) to avoid including ex post future interest rate in the
equation as a regressor, we get:
1
n
n−2 X
i=0
rF
t+i − rF
t = −δ0 +( rL
n,t − rF
t ) − δ1Lt −
1
n
rF
t−1
+(
1
n
n−2 X
j=0
vt+j + δ1ξt − et). (3.3)
Then, equation (3.3) involves running the regression:
8Rudebusch (1995) provides an excellent survey of previous empirical results.
21Model II: δ0 6=0 ,δ1 6=0 ,E t−1ηt = rF
t−1,E t−1ηt+n = Et−1rF
t+n−1
1
n
n−2 X
i=0
rF
t+i − rF
t = α + φ(rL
n,t − rF
t )+γ1rF
t−1 + γ2Lt + εt, (3.4)
where Lt is the quantity of new loans at time t,a n dεt = 1
n
Pn−2
j=0 vt+j + δ1ξt − et.
The regression (3.4) diﬀers from all tests of expectations hypothesis in the existing
literature where regressand is not 1
n
Pn−2
i=0 rF
t+i − rF
t but 1
n
Pn−1
i=0 rF
t+i − rF
t .E q u a t i o n
(3.4) cannot be estimated by OLS because εt is correlated with the regressors rL
n,t
and rF
t . Rational expectations requires εt to be uncorrelated with anything known to
banks at time t−1 but rL
n,t and rF
t a r en o ti nt h ed a t et−1 information set. Equation
(3.4) can be estimated by instrumental variables using valid instruments. We consider
two-stage least squares (2SLS) with a constant, lagged Federal funds rates, and lagged
quantities of new loans as instruments. We employ Hansen’s (1982) methods in order
to check the overidentifying restrictions and thus, test these conjectures about what is
the correct set of instruments. Hansen’s test statistic has an asymptotic χ2 distribution
with r−k degrees of freedom if the model is correctly speciﬁed, where r is the number
of instruments and k is the number of estimated coeﬃcients. According to Model II,
α = −δ0,φ=1 ,γ1 = −n−1, and γ2 = −δ1. Table 2 shows the results.
In both cases, the estimated coeﬃcients on the spread are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from unity, in contrast with the estimated
coeﬃcients on the spread in Model I. The t-test for the estimated coeﬃcient on the
spread shows that the null hypothesis that the coeﬃcient of the spread is unity is not
rejected at the 5% level in both cases. In addition, following Hansen’s (1982) method,
χ2
1 for the 1-month CP rate and χ2
2 for the 3-month CP rate are 1.288 and 5.816
respectively, so the null hypothesis that Model II is correctly speciﬁed is accepted at
22the 5% level. These results imply that these instruments are valid.9
All the estimated coeﬃcients have the signs predicted by the theoretical model de-
veloped in Section 2 and all estimated coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant at the
conventional level except on the coeﬃcients on Lt. In particular, the estimated coeﬃ-
cients on the liquidity premium are close to the values that the theoretical model implies
(-0.25 for the 1-month CP rate and -0.084 for the 3-month CP rate) and statistically
signiﬁcant, indicating that the liquidity plays an important role in explaining the term
premium. However, among two components reﬂecting the risk premium, the constant
is statistically signiﬁcant whereas the estimated coeﬃcients on Lt are not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero.
3.4 Robustness
Since we didn’t have a direct measure of the loan rate, we used the CP rates as a proxy
rate of bank loan rate instead. However, as pointed out in Kashyap et al. (1993),
bank loans are special and the commercial papers might be imperfect substitutes. In
addition, Stigum (1990) and Cook and LaRoche (1993) state that historically the CP
market has been remarkably free of default risk in contrast to bank loans. In this
p o i n to fv i e w ,t h eC Pr a t em i g h tn o tb ea ng o o dc h o i c eo fp r o x y .T oi n v e s t i g a t et h i s
issue, we consider the Euro-dollar (ED) rate as an another proxy. Even though the ED
rate is a deposit rate and a liability, it is subject to default risk and can ﬂuctuate in
accordance to bank’s liquidity demand. The 1-month and 3-month ED rates are taken
from Statistical Release provided by the Federal Reserve Board of Governor for the
9When we included lagged CP rate as an instrument on the estimation of equation (3.4), we rejected
the null hypothesis of Hansen’s test, which implies that lagged CP rates are not valid instruments. In
addition, we estimated the equation using more lagged Federal Funds rates and lagged quantities of
new loans as instruments. In some cases, we rejected the null hypothesis that the model is correctly
speciﬁed but overall the estimated results were similar.
23sample. Figure 2 plots movements in these ED rates and the Federal Funds rate. The
ED rates show very similar movements to the CD rates displayed in Figure 1.
Table 3 shows estimation results for Model I and Model II. For Model I, the results
are very similar to those of the CP rates. For Model II, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between the ED rates and the CP rates. The estimated coeﬃcients on the spread
are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from unity. The
estimated coeﬃcients on the liquidity premium are statistically signiﬁcant and quite
close to the values expected by the theoretical model. Hansen’s test statistics are 0.7
for the 1-month ED rate and 10.29 for the 3-month ED rate respectively, and we do not
reject the null, indicating that Model II is correctly speciﬁed. However, the estimated
coeﬃcients on the risk premium components are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in
contrast to the case of the CP rates.
4C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has focused on commercial banks as the main investors in ﬁnancial mar-
kets and banks’ liquidity as an important component to determine yield spreads over
diﬀerent term securities. For this end, we have developed a term structure model that
incorporates the liquidity demand by commercial banks into banks’ optimal behavior.
The paper has shown that the shadow price of the cash-in-advance constraint plays
an important role in determining the yield spread. Moreover, the empirical study has
provided evidence that when we incorporate the liquidity premium and risk premium
resulting from transaction activities into the term structure of interest rates, the ex-
pectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates might be salvaged.
The results of the paper have an important implication. As most households’ trans-
action activities are subject to their liquidity conditions, so are banks’ transaction
24activities. When banks allocate their funds into ﬁnancial securities of diﬀerent matu-
rities, they incorporate information about liquidity as well as risk into their portfolio
management decisions. Investors know that long-term assets are relatively less liquid
than short-term assets and the diﬀerence in liquidity among these ﬁnancial assets is
incorporated into their returns. This might be one reason why previous studies have
not produced a consensus about the empirical failure of the simple expectations hy-
pothesis. We feel that the story presented here provides a useful alternative to the
simple expectations hypothesis.
25Appendix A
Here, we derive equations (2.4) and (2.5), where bank loans are two-period assets
and Federal funds are one-period assets. Consider the following value function formu-
lation of the decision at the end of period t:
Ut(Lt,L t−1,L t−2,F t−1,R t−1,Dt)
=m a x
{Ft}
{rF
t Ft + βEtVt+1(Lt,L t−1,F t,R t,Dt)},
subject to
Rt−1 + Lt−2 − Lt + Ft−1 + Dt − Dt−1 − Ft ≥ θDt.
The ﬁrst-order conditions are as follows:
rF
t + βEt
∂Vt+1
∂Ft
= βEt
∂Vt+1
∂Rt
+ λt, (A1)
Rt ≥ θDt, with equality if λt > 0. (A2)
The value function of the beginning of period at time t is:
Vt(Lt−1,L t−2,F t−1,R t−1,Dt−1)=m a x
{Lt}
{rL
t Lt − (δ0Lt +
δ1
2
L2
t)
+rL
t−1Lt−1 − (δ0Lt−1 +
δ1
2
L2
t−1)
+EtUt(Lt,L t−1,L t−2,F t−1,R t−1,Dt)}
subject to
Lt ≤ Rt−1 + Lt−2.
26The ﬁrst-order conditions are as follows:
rL
t − (δ0 + δ1Lt)+Et
∂Ut
∂Lt
= ηt, (A3)
Lt ≤ Rt−1 + Lt−2, with equality if ηt > 0. (A4)
By using the envelope condition from the value function of the end of period t, we get:
∂Vt+1
∂Ft
= βEt+1
∂Vt+2
∂Rt+1
+ λt+1, (A5)
∂Vt+1
∂Rt
= βEt+1
∂Vt+2
∂Rt+1
+ ηt+1 + λt+1. (A6)
Substituting equations (A5) and (A6) into equation (A1) and simplifying it provide the
equation (2.4):
rF
t = βEtηt+1 + λt, (2.4)
In addition, we can obtain the following further result by using the envelope con-
dition for the value function at the beginning of period t:
∂Ut
∂Lt
= βEtrL
t − β(δ0 + δ1EtLt)+β3Et
∂Vt+3
∂Rt+2
+ β2Etλt+2 + β2Etηt+2
−βEtηt+1 − βEtλt+1 − β3Et
∂Vt+3
∂Rt+2
− β2Etηt+2 − β2Etλt+2 − λt
= βEtrL
t − β(δ0 + δ1EtLt) − (βEtηt+1 + λt) − βEtλt+1
∂Ut
∂Lt
= βEtrL
t − β(δ0 + δ1EtLt) − rF
t − βEtrF
t+1 + β2Etηt+2, (A7)
since βEtηt+1 + λt = rF
t ,β E tλt+1 = βEtrF
t+1 − β2Etηt+2. Substituting equation (A7)
27into equation (A3) results in equation (2.5):
rL
t − (δ0 + δ1Lt)+βrL
t − β(δ0 + δ1Lt)
= rF
t + βEtrF
t+1 + ηt − βEtηt+1. (2.5)
Appendix B
In a more general case, banks loans are n-period assets and Federal funds re-
main one-period assets and we derive equations (2.4) and (2.10). The value function
formation of the decision for the end of the period at time t is as follows:
Ut(Lt,L t−1,L t−2,...,L t−n,F t−1,R t−1,Dt)
=m a x
{Ft}
{rF
t Ft + βEtVt+1(Lt,L t−1,...,L t−n+1,F t,R t,Dt)},
subject to
Rt−1 + Lt−n + Ft−1 + Dt − Dt−1 − Lt − Ft ≥ θDt.
The ﬁrst-order conditions are as follows:
rF
t + βEt
∂Vt+1
∂Ft
= βEt
∂Vt+1
∂Rt
+ λt, (B1)
Rt ≥ θDt, with equality if λt > 0. (B2)
The value function of the beginning of period t is as follows:
28Vt(Lt−1,..,L t−n,F t−1,R t−1,Dt−1)
=m a x
{Lt}
{rL
n,tLt − (δ0Lt +
δ1
2
L2
t)+rL
n,t−1Lt−1 − (δ0Lt−1 +
δ1
2
L2
t−1)+...
+rL
n,t−n+1Lt−n+1 − (δ0Lt−n+1 +
δ1
2
L2
t−n+1)+EtUt(Lt,L t−1,...,L t−n,F t−1,R t−1,Dt)}
subject to
Lt ≤ Rt−1 + Lt−n.
The ﬁrst-order conditions are as follows:
rL
n,t +
∂Ut
∂Lt
− (δ0 + δLt)=ηt, (B3)
Lt−n + Rt−1 ≥ Lt, with equality if ηt > 0. (B4)
Using the envelope condition and equations (A5) and (A6), and substituting them into
equation (B1) result in the same equilibrium condition for the Federal funds market as
the equation (2.4) in the basic model.
In addition, we can obtain the following further result by using the envelope con-
29dition:
∂Ut
∂Lt
= βEtrL
n,t − β(δ0 + δ1Lt)+β2EtrL
n,t − β2(δ0 + δ1Lt)+... +
βn−1EtrL
n,t − βn−1(δ0 + δ1Lt)+βn+1Et
∂Vt+n+1
∂Rt+n
+ βnEtλt+n + βnEtηt+n
−λt − βEtλt+1 − ... − βnEtλt+n
−βEtηt+1 − β2Etηt+2 − ... − βnEtηt+n − βn+1Et
∂Vt+n+1
∂Rt+n
=( β + β2 + ... + βn−1)EtrL
n,t − (β + β2 + ... + βn−1)(δ0 + δ1Lt)
−βEtηt+1 − ... − βn−1Etηt+n−1 − λt − βEtλt+1 − ... − βn−1Etλt+n−1
∂Ut
∂Lt
=( β + β2 + ... + βn−1)EtrL
n,t − (β + β2 + ... + βn−1)(δ0 + δ1Lt)
−(rF
t + βEtrF
t+1 + ... + βn−1EtrF
t+n−1)+βnEtηt+n, (B5)
since βEtηt+1 + λt = rF
t ,...,βn−1Etηt+n−1 + βn−2Etλt+n−2 = βn−2EtrF
t+n−2, and
βn−1Etλt+n−1 = βn−1EtrF
t+n−1 − βnEtηt+n. Substituting equation (B5) into equation
(B3) results in equation (2.10):
(1 + β + ... + βn−1)rL
n,t − (1 + β + ... + βn−1)(δ0 + δ1Lt)
=( rF
t + βEtrF
t+1 + ... + βn−1EtrF
t+n−1)+ηt − βnEtηt+n. (2.10)
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34Table 1 The expectation hypothesis test without liquidity premium and risk premium
1
n
n−1 X
i=0
rF
t+i − rF
t = α + φ(rL
n,t − rF
t )+εt,
maturity b α b φR 2
1-month CP −0.020
(0.009)
∗∗ 0.297
(0.083)
∗∗∗ 0.169
3-month CP −0.052
(0.028)
∗ 0.488
(0.082)
∗∗∗ 0.218
Note: The numbers in parenthesis are Newey and West’s (1987) autocorrelation-
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors corrected with four lags for 1-month CP
rate and twelve lags for the 3-month CP rate. ***, **, and * denote statistical signiﬁ-
cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level in a two-tailed test respectively.
35Table 2 The expectations hypothesis test with liquidity premium and risk premium:
Two stage least squares estimation
1
n
n−2 X
i=0
rF
t+i − rF
t = α + φ(rL
n,t − rF
t )+γ1rF
t−1 + γ2Lt + εt
maturity b α b φ b γ1 b γ2 Instrument
1-month CP −0.308
(0.069)
∗∗∗ 0.903
(0.172)
∗∗∗ −0.206
(0.010)
∗∗∗ −0.005
(0.011)
constant,rF
t−2,..,rF
t−4,L t−1
3-month CP −0.385
(0.129)
∗∗∗ 0.989
(0.208)
∗∗∗ −0.047
(0.021)
∗∗ 0.027
(0.019)
constant,rF
t−1,...,rF
t−4,L t−2
Note: The numbers in parenthesis are Newey and West’s (1987) autocorrelation-
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors corrected with four lags for the 1-month
CP rate and twelve lags for the 3-month CP rate. ***, and ** denotes statistical
signiﬁcance at the 1% and 5% level in a two-tailed test respectively.
36Table 3. The expectations hypothesis test with liquidity premium and risk premium:
Federal Funds rate and the ED rates
model maturity b α b φ b γ1 b γ2 instrument
M. I 1-month −0.033
(0.009)
∗∗∗ 0.334
(0.094)
∗∗∗
3-month −0.107
(0.024)
∗∗∗ 0.457
(0.094)
∗∗∗
M. II 1-month −0.080
(0.050)
0.813
(0.148)
∗∗∗ −0.250
(0.006)
∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.011)
constant, rF
t−2,..,rF
t−4,L t−1
3-month −0.023
(0.085)
0.972
(0.105)
∗∗∗ −0.114
(0.015)
∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.006)
constant, rF
t−2,..,rF
t−12,L t−2
Note: The numbers in parenthesis are Newey and West’s (1987) autocorrelation-
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors corrected with four lags for the 1-month
ED rate and twelve lags for the 3-month ED rate. *** denotes statistical signiﬁcance
at the 1% level in a two-tailed test respectively. M.I and M.II denote the Model I in
equation (3.2) and the Model II in equation (3.4) respectively.
37Figure 1. Weekly Federal funds rate and 1-month and 3-month Commercial Paper rates
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